We consider 2-player stochastic games with perfectly observed actions, and study the limit, as the discount factor goes to one, of the equilibrium payoffs set. In the usual setup where current states are observed by the players, we show that the set of stationary equilibrium payoffs always converges, and provide a simple example where the set of equilibrium payoffs has no limit. We then introduce the more general model of hidden stochastic game, where the players publicly receive imperfect signals over current states. In this setup we present an example where not only the limit set of equilibrium payoffs does not exist, but there is no converging selection of equilibrium payoffs. This second example is robust in many aspects, in particular to perturbations of the payoffs and to the introduction of correlation or communication devices.
Introduction
Most economic and social interactions have a dynamic aspect, and equilibrium plays of dynamic games are typically not obtained by successions of myopic equilibria of the current one-shot interaction, but need to take into account both the effects of actions over current payoffs, and over future payoffs in the continuation game. In this paper we consider dynamic games with 2 players 1 , where the actions taken by the players are perfectly observed at the end of every stage. We denote by E δ , resp. E ′ δ , the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs, resp. sequential equilibrium payoffs, of the δ-discounted game, and we write E ∞ for the set of uniform equilibrium payoffs of the dynamic game. We mainly study the limit 2 of E ′ δ as players get extremely patient, i.e. as the discount factor goes to one.
1
In a repeated game, the dynamic interaction consists of the repetition of a given one-shot game, and we have the standard Folk Theorems, with pioneering work from the seventies by Aumann and Shapley, and Rubinstein. Regarding sequential equilibrium payoffs, the Folk theorem of Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) implies that for generic payoff functions, E ′ δ converges to the set of feasible and individually rational payoffs of the one-shot game, and Wen (1994) showed how to adapt the notion of individually rational payoffs to obtain a Folk theorem without genericity assumption. Without assumptions on the payoffs, E ∞ coincides with the set of feasible and individually rational payoffs of the one-shot game, and the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs E δ also converges to this set (see Sorin (1986) ). These results have been generalized in many ways to games with imperfectly observed actions (see e.g. Abreu et al. (1990) , Fudenberg Levine (1991), Fudenberg Levine Maskin (1994), Fudenberg et al. (2007) , Lehrer (1990 Lehrer ( , 1992a Lehrer ( , 1992b , or Renault Tomala (2004 ), but this is beyond the scope of the present paper.
Stochastic games were introduced by Shapley (1953) and generalize repeated games: the payoff functions of the players evolve from stage to stage, and depend on a state variable observed by the players, whose evolution is influenced by the players' actions. In the zero-sum case Bewley and Kohlberg (1976) proved the existence of the limit of the discounted value (hence of E δ and E ′ δ ) when δ goes to one. An example of Sorin (1984) shows that in the general-sum case lim δ→1 E δ and E ∞ may be non-empty and disjoint. Vieille (2000) proved that E ∞ is always non-empty, that is there exists a uniform equilibrium payoff 3 . Regarding discounted equilibrium payoffs in stochastic games, several Folk theorems have been proved under various assumptions. Dutta (1995) assumes that the set of long-run feasible payoffs is independent of the initial state, has full dimension, and that minmax long-run payoffs also do not depend on the initial state. Fudenberg 4 and Yamamoto (2011) assume that the stochastic game is irreducible (all players but one can always drive the current state where they want, possibly in many stages, with positive probability). Hörner et al. (2011) generalize the recursive methods of Fudenberg Levine Maskin (1994) to compute a limit equilibrium set in stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring when this limit set does not depend on the initial state (this happens when the Markov chain induced by any Markov strategy profile is irreducible).
All the above assumptions somehow require that the stochastic game does not depend too much on the initial state, and in particular forbid the existence of multiple absorbing 5 states with different equilibrium payoffs. We believe that it is also meaningful to study stochastic games where the actions taken can have irreversible effects on future plays. This is the case in many situations, for example in stopping games when each player only acts once and has to decide when to do so, or when the actions partially represent investment decisions, or extractions of exhaustible resources.
The first contributions of our paper concern 2-player stochastic games with finitely many states and actions. We first prove that the set of stationary 6 equilibrium payoffs of the discounted game always converges to a non-empty set. Secondly, we show that the result cannot be extended to all Nash or sequential equilibrium payoffs by providing the first example of a stochastic game where neither E δ nor E ′ δ converges. This example is relatively simple and shows that the limit equilibrium set may simply not exist in a stochastic game. However we point out that it is not robust in many aspects, such as small perturbations of the payoffs or the introduction of a correlation device. Moreover there exists a selection (x δ ) δ of E ′ δ which converges to a limit equilibrium payoff x * . This payoff x * is unique and is also the unique uniform equilibrium of the stochastic game, and we believe that even if the sequence of sets E ′ δ does not converge, x * represents the natural outcome of the game played by extremely patient players.
In the rest of the paper we introduce the more general model of hidden stochastic games, and we refer to the above original model as standard stochastic games. In a hidden stochastic game, the players still perfectly observe past actions but no longer perfectly observe current states, and rather receive at the beginning of every stage a public, possibly random, signal on the current state. So players have incomplete information over the sequence of states, but this information is common to both players. Hidden stochastic games are generalizations of hidden Markov decision processes (where there is a single agent), hence the name. Hidden stochastic games also generalize repeated games with common incomplete information on the state. We believe this model is meaningful in many interactions where the fundamentals are not perfectly known to the players. We present in particular two examples of economic interactions that could be modeled as a hidden stochastic game. The first example is a Cournot competition on a market for a natural exhaustible resource, where the players have common incomplete information on the stock of natural resources remaining. The second example is an oligopoly competition with a single good (e.g., traditional tv sets) where the state variable includes parameters known to the firms, such as the current demand level, but also parameters imperfectly known such as the trend of the market or the overall state of the economy.
Surprisingly enough, few papers have already considered stochastic games with imperfect observation of the state. In the zero-sum context, Venel (2012) studied hidden stochastic games where the players do not receive any signal on the state during the game, and proves under a commutativity assumption over transitions the existence of the limit value, as well as the stronger notion of uniform value (corresponding to uniform equilibrium payoffs). Ziliotto (2013) showed that the commutativity assumption was needed for Venel's result, and provided an example of a zero-sum hidden stochastic game 7 with payoffs in [0, 1] where the δ-discounted value oscillates between 1/2 and 5/9 when δ goes to one.
Given parameters ε in (0, 5/12) and r in (0, ε/5), we provide here an example of a 2-player hidden stochastic game with all payoffs in [0, 1], four actions for each player, having the following features:
-the game is symmetric between the players, -the players have incomplete information over the current state, but the public signal received are informative enough for the players to know the current stage payoff functions at the beginning of every stage. As a consequence, the players know their current payoffs during the play.
-there are 9 states, and for any initial state and discount factor the set of sequential equilibrium payoffs contains a square with side 2r, hence has full dimension.
-for a specific initial state k 1 , there exist subsets ∆ 1 and ∆ 2 of discount factors, both containing 1 as a limit point, such that for all discount factors in ∆ 1 , the corresponding set of sequential equilibrium payoffs is exactly the square centered in (ǫ, ǫ) with side 2r, whereas for all discount factors in ∆ 2 , the set of sequential equilibrium payoffs is the square E 2 centered in (1 − ǫ, 1 − ǫ) with side 2r. In each case the associated square is also the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs, the set of correlation equilibrium payoffs, and the set of communication 8 equilibrium payoffs of the discounted game. Since these two squares are disjoint, there is no converging selection of equilibrium payoffs, and the game has no uniform equilibrium payoff.
As an illustration, if ε = .3 and r = .05, for any discount factor in ∆ 1 the set of equilibrium payoffs is the square centered in (.3, .3) with side .1, and for any discount in ∆ 2 the set of equilibrium payoffs is the square centered in (.7, .7) with side .1.
Moreover the example is robust to small perturbations of the payoffs: if one perturbs all payoffs of the game by at most 1/2r(ε − 5r), the set of discounted equilibrium payoffs of the perturbed game with initial state k 1 still does not converge, no converging selection of equilibrium payoffs exists and there is no uniform equilibrium payoff.
Our second example is thus robust in many aspects, and it seems impossible to affect to this game a reasonable limit equilibrium payoff. The model of hidden stochastic games may be seen as a small departure from the standard model of stochastic game, but it seems very difficult for an expert to find any good answer 7 The example of Ziliotto provides a negative answer to two conjectures of Mertens (1986) for zero-sum dynamic games.
8 introduced in Myerson, 1986 and Forges, 1986. 4 to the informal question: "the game being played by extremely patient players, which outcome is likely to form ?"
We study standard stochastic games in section 2. Hidden stochastic games are introduced in section 3, and our second example is presented in section 4. The construction elaborates and improves on the zero-sum construction of Ziliotto (2013). The presentation is done here in 5 progressive steps, starting with a Markov chain on [0, 1], then a Markov Decision Process, then a zero-sum stochastic game with infinite state space, a zero-sum hidden stochastic game and a final example. A few proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
Standard Stochastic Games
We consider a 2-player stochastic game. Let K, I and J respectively be the finite sets of states, actions for player 1 and actions for player 2. k 1 in K is the initial state, u 1 and u 2 are the state dependent utility functions from K × I × J −→ IR, and q is the transition function from K × I × J to ∆(K), the set of probabilities over K. At every period t ≥ 1 players first learn the current state k t ∈ K and simultaneously select actions i t ∈ I and j t ∈ J. These actions are then publicly observed, the stage payoffs are u 1 (k t , i t , j t ) for player 1 and u 2 (k t , i t , j t ) for player 2, a new state k t+1 is selected according to the distribution q(k t , i t , j t ), and the play goes to the next period. Given a discount factor δ in [0, 1), the δ-discounted stochastic game is the infinite horizon game where player 1 and player 2's payoffs are respectively (1 − δ)
. Let E δ and E ′ δ respectively denote the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs and the set of perfect 9 equilibrium payoffs of the δ-discounted stochastic game. Standard fixed-point arguments show the existence of a stationary equilibrium in this game, and the associated equilibrium payoff lies in E ′ δ and E δ . In this paper, we are mainly interested in the asymptotic behavior of these sets when players become more and more patient, i.e. we will look for their limit 10 when δ goes to 1. And we will also briefly consider the set E ∞ of uniform equilibrium 11 payoffs of the stochastic game.
When there is a single state, the game is a standard repeated game with perfect monitoring, and we have well-known Folk Theorems.
9 subgame-perfect equilibrium, or equivalently here, sequential equilibrium, or equivalently perfect public equilibrium, as defined in Fudenberg Levine Maskin 1994 for repeated games with perfect public monitoring and extended to stochastic games in Fudenberg Yamamoto 2011. 10 All limits of sets in the paper are to be understood for Hausdorff distance between nonempty compact sets of IR 2 . 11 Throughout the paper, we say that a vector u in IR 2 is a uniform equilibrium payoff if for all ε > 0, there exists a strategy profile such that for all high enough discount factors, the profile is a ε-Nash equilibrium of the discounted game with payoff ε-close to u, see Sorin 1986 , Mertens Sorin and Zamir 1994 or Vieille 2000 for related definitions.
For zero-sum stochastic games, Shapley (1953) proved that the value v δ exists and players have stationary optimal strategies, so E δ and E ′ δ are singletons. Bewley and Kohlberg (1976) proved the convergence of v δ (hence, of E δ and E ′ δ ) using algebraic arguments.
The following proposition shows how the Bewley Kohlberg result extends to general-sum games. Denote by E ′′ δ the set of stationary equilibrium payoffs of the δ-discounted game. In the zero-sum case,
In general, stationary equilibria are very simple equilibria where the strategies of the players are particularly restricted, and E ′′ δ is a subset of E ′ δ . Proposition 2.1. There exists a non-empty compact set E such that:
In the case of repeated games (a single state), E reduces to set of mixed Nash equilibrium payoffs of the one-shot game, hence may not be convex. The proof of proposition 2.1 is in the Appendix and largely relies on the semi-algebraicity of the set of discount factors and associated stationary equilibria and payoffs. As stated here, it holds for any 2-player stochastic game with finitely many states and actions, but the proof easily extends to the n-player case. As a consequence, using a point in E one can construct a selection (x δ ) δ of (E ′ δ ) δ which converges, i.e. it is possible to select, for each discount δ, a perfect equilibrium payoff x δ of the corresponding game in a way such x δ has a limit when δ goes to one. We mention that this existence of a converging selection of equilibrium payoffs can also be easily deduced from Mertens Sorin Zamir (1994 It is then natural to ask if the convergence property also holds for E δ and E ′ δ . We conclude this section by providing the first example of a stochastic game where these sets of equilibrium payoffs diverge. Proposition 2.2. There exists a 2-player stochastic game where neither E δ nor E ′ δ converge.
The proof follows from the following example.
Example 2.3. Consider the stochastic game represented by the following picture.
There are 7 states: k 1 (the initial state), k 2 , k 3 and 4 absorbing states: (1/2, 0) * , (0, 1/2) * , (−1, −1) * and (0, 1) * . When an absorbing state (a, b) * is reached, the game stays there forever and at each stage the payoffs to player 1 and player 2 are respectively a and b. The sets of actions are I = {T, B} for player 1 and J = {L, R} for player 2. The transition from state k 1 only depends on player 1's action, as indicated in the above figure, and similarly the transition from state k 2 only depends on player 2's action. If in state k 3 the action profile (T, L) is played, the vector payoff is (1, 0) and the play remains in k 3 . To conclude the description, we have to specify the payoffs in states k 1 , k 2 , and k 3 . The payoff in k 1 is (1/2, 0) if T is played and (1/2, 1/2) if B is played. The payoff in state k 2 does not depend on the actions played and is (1/2, 1/2), and he payoffs in state k 3 are simply given by the bimatrix (1, 0) (
For each discount, it is clear that (1/2, 0) is in E δ , and the question is whether there are other equilibrium payoffs, for instance (1/2, 1/2).
First consider any δ in [0, 1), and a Nash equilibrium (σ, τ ) of the δ-discounted stochastic game with equilibrium payoff (x, y). Because Player 1 can play T in the initial state, x ≥ 1/2. Because the sum of payoffs never exceeds 1, we have x + y ≤ 1. Assume now that under (σ, τ ) the state k 3 has positive probability to be reached, and denote by (x 3 , y 3 ) the discounted payoffs induced by (σ, τ ) given that k 3 is reached. We have x 3 ≥ 1/2, because player 1 will not accept to play B at k 1 if he obtains a payoff lower than 1/2 afterwards. Similarly, y 3 ≥ 1/2. Since x 3 + y 3 ≤ 1, we get x 3 = y 3 = 1/2, so (1/2, 1/2) is an equilibrium payoff of the reduced stochastic game:
The unique way to obtain (1/2, 1/2) as a feasible payoff in the reduced game is to play first (T, L) for a certain number of periods N, then (B, R) at period N + 1. Given δ, the integer N has to satisfy (1 − δ)
If no such integer N exists, we obtain that (1/2, 1/2) is not an equilibrium payoff of the reduced game, so under (σ, τ ) the state k 3 has zero probability to be reached, which implies that x = 1/2 and y = 0.
We define ∆ 1 as the set of discount factors of the form δ = (
is a positive integer, and we put ∆ 2 = [0, 1)\∆ 1 . We have obtained:
. The pure strategy profiles where: T is played at stage 1, R is played at stage 2, (T, L) is played for N periods from stage 3 to stage N + 2, and (B, R) is played at stage N + 3, form a subgameperfect Nash equilibrium of the δ-discounted game with payoff (1/2, 1/2). By mixing between T and B in k 1 , it is then possible to obtain any point (1/2, x), with 0 ≤ x ≤ 1/2, as an equilibrium payoff. And no other point can be obtained, because in every equilibrium, the vector payoff conditional on k 3 being reached, is (1/2, 1/2). We have obtained:
Because both ∆ 1 and ∆ 2 contain discount factors arbitrarily close to 1, lemmas 2.4 and 2.5 establish proposition 2.2.
Remark 2.6. One can also consider for any positive integer n, the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs E n and subgame-perfect equilibrium payoffs E ′ n of the nperiod stochastic game, where the overall payoff is defined as the arithmetic average of the stage payoffs. Similar arguments show that in the above example, we have E n = E ′ n = {1/2} × [0, 1/2] for n odd, and E n = E ′ n = {(1/2, 0)} for n even. So E n and E ′ n also do not converge when n goes to infinity.
We want to point out that Example 2.3 is limited in many ways. In particular: -An important feature of the reduced game is that there is (at most) a unique way to obtain the payoff (1/2,1/2). As soon as one perturbs the payoffs, this property will disappear. This example is not robust to perturbations of the payoffs of the stochastic game.
-Many Folk theorems in the literature require the limit set to have non-empty interior. Here E δ = E ′ δ has empty interior for each discount factor. -The example is not robust to the introduction of a correlation device. If when k 3 is reached, the players can publicly observe the outcome of a fair coin tossing, they can correlate and play there (T, L) and (B, R) with probability 1/2. With such correlation device, it is possible to obtain (1/2, 1/2) as an equilibrium payoff for all discount factors.
The counterexample of the next section will not have these properties and will be very robust in many aspects.
To conclude with Example 2.3, for all converging selections (x δ ) δ of (E ′ δ ) δ , the limit payoff is (1/2, 0), and for all discount δ the unique stationary equilibrium payoffs is also (1/2, 0). Moreover, one can show that E ∞ = {(1/2, 0)}, i.e. the unique uniform equilibrium payoff is (1/2, 0). And playing B in k 1 is somehow a risky option for player 1, since he can immediately secure 1/2 by playing T and has almost no chance to get a better payoff by playing B. So even if the sets of equilibrium payoffs do not converge, the payoff (1/2, 0) clearly emerges, and we believe it can be considered as the reasonable limit outcome of the stochastic game. If an expert is asked "The game being played by extremely patient players, which outcome is likely to form ?", we clearly would recommend the answer to be (1/2, 0).
Hidden Stochastic Games
We enlarge the model of stochastic games by assuming that at the beginning of every period, the players observe a public signal on the current state. We still denote by K, I and J respectively the finite sets of states, actions for player 1 and actions for player 2, and we introduce a finite set S of public signals. As in the previous section, u 1 and u 2 are the state dependent utility functions from K × I × J −→ IR, but now the transition function q goes from K × I × J to ∆(K × S), the set of probabilities over K × S, and there is an initial distribution π in ∆(K × S). The elements K, I, J, S, u 1 , u 2 , q and π are known to the players.
At the first period, a couple (k 1 , s 1 ) is selected according to π, and the players publicly observe s 1 , but not k 1 . The players simultaneously select actions i 1 ∈ I and j 1 ∈ J, then these actions are publicly observed, the stage payoffs are u 1 (k 1 , i 1 , j 1 ) for player 1 and u 2 (k 1 , i 1 , j 1 ) for player 2, and the play goes to period 2. At every period t ≥ 2, a couple (k t , s t ) is selected according to q(k t−1 , i t−1 , j t−1 ), k t is the state of period t but the players only observe the public signal s t . Then they simultaneously select actions i t ∈ I and j t ∈ J. These actions are publicly observed, the stage payoffs are u 1 (k t , i t , j t ) for player 1 and u 2 (k t , i t , j t ) for player 2, and the play goes to the period t + 1. Given a discount factor δ in [0, 1), the δ-discounted hidden stochastic game is the game with payoff functions (1 − δ)
We respectively denote by E δ and E ′ δ the sets of Nash equilibrium payoffs and sequential equilibrium payoffs of this game. This is a generalization of the model of stochastic game presented in section 2, where one has S = K and s t = k t for all t. In the model of hidden stochastic game (HSG, for short), the players have incomplete information on the current state, but this information is common to both players, and can be represented by a belief p t on the state k t . Given the initial signal s 1 , the initial belief p 1 is the conditional probability induced by π on K given s 1 . The belief p t is a random variable which can be computed 12 recursively from p t−1 by Bayes' rule after observing the public signal s t and the past actions i t−1 and j t−1 . We can thus associate to our HSG, an equivalent stochastic game where the state variable p lies in ∆(K) and represents the common belief on the current state in the HSG, and where now actions and state variables are publicly observed, in addition to the public 13 signal s. A strategy in the HSG uniquely defines an equivalent strategy in the stochastic game, and vice-versa. And in particular the sets of equilibrium payoffs of the two games coincide. By definition, a stationary strategy in the associated stochastic game plays after every history a mixed action which only depends on the current state variable in ∆(K). And we will say that a strategy σ in the HSG is stationary if the associated strategy in the stochastic game is stationary, that is if σ plays after every history a mixed action which only depends on the current belief in ∆(K). Standard fixed-point (contraction) arguments show that E δ and E ′ δ are nonempty, and there exists a stationary equilibrium in the δ-discounted associated stochastic game. We will also briefly consider the set of uniform equilibrium payoffs E ∞ , defined as in the previous section.
When there is a single player (for instance, when player 2 has a unique action), a hidden stochastic game is simply a partially observable Markov decision process (POMDP), and if moreover player 1 plays constantly the same mixed action, we obtain a Hidden Markov model, which can be considered as the simplest model of dynamic Bayesian network. Hidden stochastic games generalize both standard stochastic games and POMDP. An interesting subclass of hidden stochastic games is the following class of HSG with known payoffs, where the public signals are rich enough for the players to know after every history what is the current payoff function. We write q(k, i, j)(k ′ , s) the probability in [0, 1] that the couple (k ′ , s) is chosen when the probability q(k, i, j) is used.
Definition 3.1. The hidden stochastic game has known payoffs if the set of states K can be partitioned 14 in a way such that for all states k, k
(two states in the same element of the partition induce the same payoff function), and
observing the public signal is enough to deduce the element of the partition containing the current state).
In a hidden stochastic game with known payoffs, the players know after every history the cell of the partition containing the current state, so when players choose their actions they know the current payoff function, as it happens in a standard stochastic game . However they may not exactly know the current state in K, so they are uncertain about the transition probabilities to the next state, and to the cell containing this state. In a standard stochastic game, one can define: k ∼ k ′ if and only if k = k ′ , and the conditions of definition 3.1 are satisfied. Hence HSG with known payoffs generalize stochastic games, and this generalization is meaningful in several cases.
actions or on the state variable. Its unique influence is that it may be used by the players as a correlation device. Notice that the equivalent stochastic game is not a standard stochastic games as described in section 2.
14 We write k 1 ∼ k 2 whenever k 1 and k 2 are in the same equivalence class, or cell, of the partition.
Example 3.2. The players are firms competingà la Cournot on a market for a natural exhaustible resource. Only two firms are present on this market, and in each period, each firm decides how much resource to extract (to produce). Then a price is set in order to equalize offer and demand, and all the production is sold at this price. Action sets are I = {0, ..., M 1 } and J = {0, ..., M 2 } where M f is the maximal possible production (e.g., in tonnes) of firm f . The state variable k is the amount of natural resources remaining (the stock), and the firms have incomplete information on remaining stocks. They have a common belief on the initial stock value k 1 , and there is a cap M such that in each period, if the current stock k is greater than M the firms just know that there are at least M remaining resources, whereas if k is at most M the firms precisely know k. Transitions are deterministic : if in some state k, actions i and j such that i + j ≤ k are played, then it is possible for the firms to actually produce the quantities x and y, and the next state is 15 k − (i + j). If k > i + j, the next state is 0 and the game is essentially over. Payoffs are function of the actions, and possibly of the current state as well (when the state is lower than the sum of productions, or when the state does not exceed M and the demand anticipates the scarcity of the resource).
Example 3.3. Consider an oligopoly with two firms on a market for a single good. In each period (e.g., a year) a firm chooses her selling price, as well as development and advertising budgets. The state variable k represents the state of the market, which includes, but is not limited to, the current demand function for each firm, which is a function of the current price profile. The state also contains additional information about fundamentals which will influence the future evolution of the demand, such as the trend of the market, the development of close goods by other firms or the overall state of the economy. In each period revenues are determined by the current demand function and the current prices chosen, and stage payoffs are the revenues minus development and advertising budgets. Transitions of the state variable depend on the state variable and the actions chosen, and firms are able to observe at the beginning of every period, at least the current demand function but possibly not all characteristics of the state.
Regarding limit equilibrium payoffs in hidden stochastic games, we know by proposition 2.2 that there is no hope to obtain convergence of the sequences (E δ ) δ or (E ′ δ ) δ . The following result shows that the situation is even more dramatic in our context of hidden stochastic games. Theorem 3.4. For each ε in (0, 5 12 ] and r in (0, ε/5), there exists a 2-player Hidden Stochastic Game Γ having the following properties:
1. There are 9 states, 9 public signals, four actions for each player, and all payoffs lie in [0, 1], 2. The game is symmetric between the players, and has known payoffs, 3. For all initial distributions and discount factors, the corresponding set of sequential equilibrium payoffs contains a square of side 2r, hence has full dimension, 4. There is an initial state k 1 , perfectly known to the players, and there exist two subsets ∆ 1 and ∆ 2 of [0, 1), both containing discount factors arbitrarily close to 1, such that:
Moreover for δ in ∆ 1 ∪∆ 2 , the associated square is also the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs, the set of correlated equilibrium payoffs, and the set of communication equilibrium payoffs of the δ-discounted game, as well as the set of stationary equilibrium payoffs of the associated stochastic game with state variable the belief on the states of the original game. There is no converging selection (x δ ) δ of (E δ (η)) δ , and Γ has no uniform equilibrium payoff. ), a perturbed game Γ(η) obtained by perturbing each payoff of Γ by at most η. The initial state being k 1 , denote by E δ (η) the corresponding set of δ-discounted Nash equilibrium payoffs. We have:
There is no converging selection (x δ ) δ of (E δ (η)) δ , and Γ(η) has no uniform equilibrium payoff. Finally,
the case ε = .3, r = .05
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The rest of the paper is devoted to the construction of the example of theorem 3.4. We progressively introduce more and more ingredients in the construction, starting with a Markov chain on [0, 1], then a Markov Decision Process, then a zero-sum stochastic game with infinite state space, a zero-sum HSG and finally our example 16 . We denote respectively by IN and IR + the sets of non negative integers and non negative real numbers. Given a parameter α ∈ (0, 1), we consider the following Markov chain with state variable q in [0, 1] and initial state q 0 = 1. Time is discrete, and if q t is the state of period t then with probability α the next state q t+1 is α q t and with probability 1 − α the next state q t+1 is 1.
Because of the transitions, the set of states that can be reached is the countable set {α a , a ∈ IN}. This Markov chain can be viewed as follows: there is an infinite sequence X 1 , ..., X t , ... of i.i.d. Bernouilli random variables with success parameter α, we add an initial constant variable X 0 = 0, and at any period t the state of the Markov chain is α a if and only if the last a (but not a+ 1) realizations of the Bernouilli variables have been successful, i.e. iff X t−a− = 0 and X t ′ = 1 for t − a + 1 ≤ t ′ ≤ t. In the next subsection, the variable q will be interpreted as a risk variable with the following interpretation. Suppose a decision-maker observes the realizations of the Markov chain, and has to decide as a function of q when he will take a risky action, having probability of success 1 − q and probability of failure q. He would like q to be as small as possible, but time is costly and there is a discount factor δ. For a in IN, we denote by T a the stopping time of the first period where the risk is α a , i.e.
If a = 0, then T a = 1 and δ Ta = δ. If a ≥ 1, then T a is a random variable which law can be easily computed by induction. Indeed, we have:
where T ′ a has the same law as T a and is independent from X Ta−1 . As a consequence,
IE(T a ) grows exponentially with a, and this is a important feature of our counterexample: while slightly decreasing the risk α a in the bounded set (0, 1], the number of stages one may have to wait before reaching the new risk level greatly increases.
The expectation of δ Ta will play an important role in the sequel and can be easily computed as well (see e.g. lemma 2.2 and proposition 2.6 in [11] ).
A Markov Decision Process on [0,1]
We introduce a player who observes the realizations of the above Markov chain and can choose as a function of the state q when he will take a risky action, having probability of success 1 − q and probability of failure q. In case of success, the payoff of the player will be R at all subsequent stages, where R is a fixed positive reward. The payoff is 0 at any stage before taking the risky action, and at any stage after the risky action has been taken unsuccessfully. Overall payoffs are discounted with discount δ.
In this MDP with finite actions set, there exists a pure stationary optimal strategy. Notice that a pure stationary strategy of the player can be represented by a non negative integer a, corresponding to the risk threshold α a . We define the a-strategy of the player as the strategy where he/she takes the risky action as soon as the state variable of the Markov chain does not exceed α a . The expected discounted payoff induced is
Hence using lemma 4.1, we obtain:
The payoff of the a-strategy in the MDP with parameter α and discount δ is:
This payoff is proportional to R > 0, hence the optimal strategies do not depend on the value of R. Intuitively this is clear, counting the reward in Dollars or Euros does not affect the strategic problem of the decision-maker. This problem is now to choose a non negative integer a maximizing the above payoff function. 
and let v α,δ = max a∈IN s α,δ (a) denote the value of the δ-discounted MDP with parameter α and reward R = 1 . v α,δ = max a∈IN s α,δ (a) is clear 17 since there exists a pure optimal stationary strategy in the δ-discounted MDP. The parameter α being fixed, we are now interested in maximizing s α,δ for δ close to 1. Differentiating the function (a → (1−α a ) 1−α+(1−δ)α −a ) and proceeding by asymptotical equivalence when δ goes to 1, naturally leads to the introduction of the following quantity.
Definition 4.4. When δ ∈ [α, 1), we define a * = a * (α, δ) in IR + such that:
, a ∈ IN} be the set of discount factors δ such that a * (α, δ) is an integer, and let ∆ 2 (α) = {1 − (1 − α)α 2a+1 , a ∈ IN} be the set of discount factors δ such that a * (α, δ) − 1/2 is an integer.
∆ 1 (α) and ∆ 2 (α) contain discount factors arbitrarily close to 1. a * can be expressed in closed form as a * =
. Since δ ln(1−δ) converges to 1 when δ goes to 1, we obtain:
2) For α < 1/4 and δ ∈ ∆ 1 (α), the a * (α, δ)-strategy is optimal in the MDP and lim δ→1,δ∈∆ 1 (α)
3) For all α,
The convergence property in 1) is very intuitve: when δ is high, the decisionmaker can wait for the state variable to be very low, so that she takes the risky action with high probability of success. Points 2) (when α < 1/4) and 3) give asymptotic expansions for the value v α,δ when δ goes to 1, respectively of the form
, where ε α and ε ′ α are functions with limit 0 when δ goes to 1. Later on, the parameter α will be small, and the situation of the associated player will be much better when δ is close to 1 in ∆ 1 (α) compared to when δ is close to 1 in ∆ 2 (α). The proof of proposition 4.5 is based on simple computations that are presented in the Appendix.
A zero-sum stochastic game with perfect information
We fix here two parameters α and β in (0, 1), and define a 2-player zero-sum stochastic game Γ α,β with infinite state space: (1, q)
(1, αq)
The initial state is (2, 1). The sum of the payoffs of the players is constant 18 equal to 1. States 0 * and 1 * are absorbing states with, respectively, payoffs 0 and 1 to player 1. The payoffs only depend on the states, and the payoff of player 1 is 0 in a state of the form (1, q) , and 1 in a state of the form (2, l). Each player has 2 actions: Wait or Jump. Transitions in a state (1, q) are controlled by player 1 only: if player 1 Waits in state (1, q), then the next state is (1, αq) with probability α and (1, 1) with probability 1 − α, as in the MDP of subsection 4.2, and if player 1 Jumps in state (1, q), then the next state is 0 * with probability q and (2, 1) with probability 1 − q. Similarly, transitions in a state (2, l) are controlled by player 2 only: if player 2 Waits in state (2, l), then the next state is (2, βl) with probability β and (2, 1) with probability 1 − β, and if player 2 Jumps in state (2, l), then the next state is 1 * with probability l and (1, 1) with probability 1 − l. Payoffs are discounted with discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1), and the value of the stochastic game is denoted v α,β,δ .
The strategic aspects of this game have strong similarities with those of the previous MDP. Consider for instance Player 1, his payoff is 0 in 0 * and all states (1, q), and his payoff is 1 in 1 * and the states (2, l). Starting from state (1,1), the only possibility for Player 1 to obtain positive payoffs is to Jump at some period to try to reach the state (2, 1). He can wait for the state to be (1, q) with q small, so that the risk of reaching the state 0 * while jumping is low, but each period in a state (1, q) gives him a null payoff so he should not wait too long. The situation is symmetric for player 2, apart from the fact that the initial state is (2, 1), hence controled by him.
Since the game is discounted and states are controlled by a single player, it is natural to look at pure stationary 19 strategies of the players. Assume that Player 2 uses a b-strategy. Then Player 1 faces a MDP with finite action sets, hence he/she has a pure stationary best reply, that is Player 1 has a best reply in the stochastic game in the form of a a-strategy. Similarly, if Player 1 uses a a-strategy, Player 2 has a best reply in the stochastic game in the form of a b-strategy. It is then natural to consider the game restricted to a-and b-strategies. 
, where T a is the random variable defined in subsection 4.1 and IE α denotes the expectation for the Markov chain with parameter α. Similarly, one has s β,δ (b) = (1 − β b )IE β (T b ). Starting from the initial state, with probability β b the first Jump of player 2 will end up in 1 * and the payoff for player 1 will be 1 in each period, and with probability 1 − β b the game will first stay T b stages in a state controlled by player 2 and then reach the state (1, 1). This gives:
where g ′ α,β,δ (a, b) denotes the payoff of the a-strategy against the b-strategy in the game with initial state (1, 1) . δ (a, b) . Hence the result of lemma 4.7.
Let us come back to the consideration that Player 2 plays a b-strategy, and denote by R the best payoff that Player 1 can obtain against this strategy from the state (1, 1) (if the play never reaches this state, then player 1 has nothing to do and gets a payoff of 1 in each period). We have seen that Player 1 has a best reply in the form of a a-strategy, and finding the best a is equivalent to finding a pure optimal strategy in the MDP of subsection 4.2 with reward R. But we have seen in subsection 4.2 that this optimal value for a does not depend on R, and simply maximizes s α,δ (a). This implies that the best reply of player 1 does not depend on b, and the corresponding a-strategy is a dominant strategy of player 1 in the zero-sum stochastic game restricted to pure stationary strategies. The existence of dominant strategies in a zero-sum game is rather rare, and this is an important property of the present example. It can be verified analytically by looking at the function g α,β,δ : for all b, it is increasing in s α,δ (a), and for all a, it is decreasing in s β,δ (b). This proves 1) in the proposition below. # -strategy, resp. the b # -strategy, is a dominant strategy for player 1, resp. player 2, in the zero-sum stochastic game restricted to pure stationary strategies.
2) The a # -strategy, resp. the b # -strategy, is an optimal strategy for player 1, resp. player 2, in the zero-sum stochastic game Γ α,β .
3) The value of Γ α,β satisfies:
Proof:
2) The strategy profile induced by (a # , b # ) is a Nash equilibrium of the game Γ α,β restricted to pure stationary strategies. Since against a pure stationary strategy each player has a pure stationary best reply, this strategy profile is indeed a Nash equilibrium of the game Γ α,β . Hence the value of Γ α,β is the payoff induced by this strategy profile, and 3) follows.
. We are interested in cases where α = β, and the next proposition is a building brick for our global construction. Proof: We proceed in 2 steps.
Step 1: Define
Discount factors in ∆ 1 (α, β) simultaneously favor player 1 and disfavor player 2 in their respective MDP: for δ ∈ ∆ 1 (α, β), we have by proposition 4.5 that
is decreasing in v β,δ , we obtain:
, where lim
This implies, if ∆ 1 (α, β) contains discount factors arbitrarily close to 1:
In the same vein, we define:
Discount factors in ∆ 2 (α, β) simultaneously disfavor player 1 and favor player 2 in their respective MDP, and similar computations as above show that if ∆ 2 (α, β) contains discount factors arbitrarily close to 1,
Our goal, inspired by (1) and (2), is now to construct α and β arbitrarily small such that both ∆ 1 (α, β) and ∆ 2 (α, β) contain discount factors arbitrarily close to 1.
Step 2: For α ∈ (0, 1), we define β(α) =
(1 − α)α 2 = (1 − β)β and β < α.
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We have lim α→0 β(α) = 0, and lim α→0 β(α)
) has limit 2 in 0, is continuous and not constant. Consequently for η > 0, it is possible to choose α in (0, η) such that
is a rational number of the form p/q, with p, q odd positive integers. Fix such α and β = β(α), we have (1 − α)α 2 = (1 − β)β and α = β q/p , with p, q odd positive integers. Consider now the sets :
(1, 0) belongs to A. Assume (a, b) belongs to A. Then we have:
and we obtain that (a +
) belongs to B. Moreover,
hence (a + p, b + q) belongs to A. We conclude that A and B contain, for each M, points (a, b) such that a ≥ M and b ≥ M. This implies that both ∆ 1 (α, β) and ∆ 2 (α, β) contain discount factors arbitrarily close to 1. Since β ≤ α ≤ η, the inequalities of the first step imply:
, and lim sup , and the proof of proposition 4.9 is complete since η can be taken arbitrarily small.
A zero-sum hidden stochastic game
The MDP and games considered so far have perfect information and infinite state space. We now mimic the previous construction with a hidden stochastic game with 6 states and 6 public signals.
α and β being parameters in (0, 1), the HSG Γ * (α, β) is defined as follows. The set of states is K = {(1, 1), (1, 0), (2, 1), (2, 0), 1 * , 0 * }, and the set of public signals is S = {s 1 , s
The players perfectly observe past actions and public signals, but not current states. As in the previous stochastic game, the sum of the payoffs of the players is constantly 1, and the states 0 * and 1 * are absorbing. The payoffs only depend on the states, player 1 has payoff 0 in states 0 * , (1, 0) and (1, 1), and payoff 1 in states 1 * , (2, 0) and (2, 1). Each player has 2 actions corresponding to Wait and Jump, action sets are I = {W 1 , J 1 } and J = {W 2 , J 2 }. The initial probability π selects with probability 1 the state (2, 1) and the signal s 2 , so the players know that at period 1 the game is in state (2, 1) . Once in the absorbing state 0 * , resp. 1 * , the play stays there forever and the public signal is s * 0 , resp. s * 1 . Transitions from states (1, 0) and (1, 1) only depend on the action of player 1, whereas transitions from (2, 0) and (2, 1) only depend on the action of player 2, and when we write transitions we will omit the action of the player without influence. More precisely:
If player 1 Jumps in state (1, 1), the play goes to the absorbing state 0 * and the public signal is s *
If player 1 Jumps in state (1, 0), the play goes to state (2, 1) and the public signal is s 2 , i.e. q((1, 0), J 1 ) selects ((2, 1), s 2 ) a.s.
Transition when player 1 Waits in state (1, 1): q((1, 1), W 1 ) selects ((1, 1), s 1 ) with probability 1 − α, ((1, 1) , s ′ 1 ) with probability α 2 and ((1, 0), s ′ 1 ) with probability α(1 − α).
Transition when player 1 Waits in state (1, 0): q((1, 0), W 1 ) selects ((1, 1) , s 1 ) with probability 1 − α, and ((1, 0), s ′ 1 ) with probability α.
Transitions from the states controlled by player 2 are defined symmetrically: 1) , s 2 ) with probability 1 − β, ((2, 1), s ′ 2 ) with probability β 2 and ((2, 0), s ′ 2 ) with probability β(1 − β), and finally q((2, 0), W 2 ) selects ((2, 1), s 2 ) with probability 1 − β and ((2, 0), s ′ 2 ) with probability β. Payoffs are discounted with discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1). (1, 1)
Signals in states (1, 0) and (1, 1) are either s 1 or s 
}, {1
* }} that contains the current state, and the game has known payoffs.
In Γ * (α, β), player 1 would like to Jump in state (1, 0), and to Wait in state (1, 1) but the current state is not fully known to the players. Because of the previous partition, the belief of the players over the current state has at most 2 points in its support. Suppose this belief corresponds to the state being (1, 1) with probability q and (1, 0) with probability 1 − q. The current payoff will be 0, and the transition only depends on player 1's action:
If player 1 Jumps, the new state is 0 * with probability q and (2, 1) with probability 1 − q.
If player 1 Waits: with probability 1 − α the public signal will be s 1 and by Bayes' rule the players can deduce that the new state is almost surely (1, 1) . With probability α the public signal is s ′ 1 , the probability that the transition selects ((1, 1) , s ′ 1 ) is qα 2 so by Bayes' rule the belief of the players over the new state is : (1, 1) with probability qα and (1, 0) with probability 1 − qα.
Consequently the transitions and the payoffs here perfectly mimic those of the stochastic game of subsection 4.3. The equivalent stochastic game associated to the HSG Γ * (α, β) (see the beginning of section 3) corresponds to the game Γ(α, β), up to the addition of the observation of the public signal at the beginning of each period. This addition plays no role on the payoffs and could only be used as a correlation device for the players, but in a zero-sum context this has no influence on the value. We obtain: Proposition 4.10. The value of the δ-discounted hidden stochastic game Γ * (α, β) is the value v α,β,δ of the δ-discounted stochastic game Γ(α, β).
A final example
Fix ε ∈ (0, 5 12 ] and r in (0, ε/5), we finally construct a non zero-sum HSG Γ satisfying the conditions of theorem 3.4. By proposition 4.9, it is possible to fix α and β such that: lim inf , 1), v α,β,δ > ε + 5r}. Because we want all payoffs of Γ to be in [0, 1], we first modify the zero-sum HSG Γ * (α, β) of subsection 4.4 by transforming all payoffs (1, 0) into (1−r, r) and all payoffs (0, 1) into (r, 1 − r). That is, we apply the affine increasing transformation (x → r + (1 − 2r)x) to the payoffs, and the game remains constant-sum. We obtain a new HSG Γ 1 with each payoff in [r, 1 − r], and the δ-discounted value of this new game is simply v δ = r + (1 − 2r)v α,β,δ . We also define the HSG Γ 2 as the game Γ 1 where the identity of the players are exchanged: player 1 in Γ 2 plays the role of player 2 in Γ 1 , and vice-versa. Plainly, the value of Γ 2 is 1−v δ .
We now define our final HSG Γ. The states are the 6 states (1, 1), (1, 0), (2, 1), (2, 0), 1 * , 0 * of Γ * (α, β), plus 3 extra states k 1 , (ε, ε) * and (1 − ε, 1 − ε) * : k 1 is the initial state and is known to the players, and (ε, ε) * and (1 − ε, 1 − ε) * are absorbing states where the payoffs will partly depend on the actions played. Actions sets are I = {W 1 , J 1 } × {T, B} and J = {W 2 , J 2 } × {L, R}. Γ is defined as the "independent sum" of two different games played in parallel, the first game evolving according to the first coordinate of the actions, and the second game evolving according to the second coordinate of the actions. 1) At the first period, the actions of the players determine, through their first coordinate 20 a continuation game to be played:
is played in period 1, the game reaches the absorbing state (ε, ε)
, is played in period 1, then from period 2 on the hidden stochastic game Γ 2 , resp. Γ 1 , is played. The payoffs of the first game in period 1 are respectively defined as (ε, ε),
2) In addition, at every period of Γ the players play, through the second coordinate of their actions, the following bimatrix game G, independently of everything else. Past actions are perfectly observed. The public signals are those of Γ 1 or Γ 2 when these games are played, and we add one specific public signal for the initial state and each absorbing state (ε, ε) * and (1 − ε, 1 − ε) * , so that Γ has 9 public signals and is a hidden stochastic game with known payoffs. Moreover the game is symmetric between the players.
First notice that in G, each player chooses the payoff of the other player, hence any profile is a Nash equilibrium, and the equilibrium payoff set of G is the square of feasible payoffs [−r, r]
2 . For each initial probability and discount factor, the modification of Γ where the game G is removed has a sequential equilibrium yielding some payoff (x, y). Combining independently such equilibrium with any sequential equilibrium of the repetition of G gives a sequential equilibrium of Γ. Then the square centered in (x, y) with side 2r is included in the set of sequential equilibrium of Γ for this initial probability and discount factor. This proves the third item of theorem 3.4.
From now on, we consider the game Γ with initial state k 1 . The idea is quite simple: for δ in ∆ 1 , v δ will be significantly smaller than ε and all equilibria of Γ will play (W 1 , W 2 ) in the first period; whereas for δ in ∆ 2 , v δ will be much greater than ε and all equilibria of Γ will play (J 1 , J 2 ) in period 1.
, and this is also the set of communication equilibria of the δ-discounted game, as well as the set of stationary equilibrium payoffs of the associated stochastic game.
2
Proof: First consider, for any discount δ, the subgame induced by Γ after (J 1 , W 2 ) has been played in period 1, discounted from period 2 on. By playing optimally in the Γ 1 component, player 1 can secure a payoff of v δ − r, whereas player 2 can secure a payoff of 1 − v δ − r. Since the sum of the payoffs is not greater than 1 + 2r, all equilibrium payoffs of this subgame lie in the set
Symmetrically, equilibrium payoffs of the subgame induced by Γ after (J 1 , W 2 ) has been played in period 1, belong to the square [ 
1) Fix a discount factor δ in ∆ 1 . We have v δ = r+(1−2r)v α,β,δ , so δv δ < ε−4r. Consider a Nash equilibrium (σ, τ ) of the δ-discounted game Γ, and denote by x, resp. y, the probability that σ plays W 1 , resp. τ plays W 2 at stage 1. We will show that x = y = 1, and first assume for the sake of contradiction that x < 1. By playing W 1 at period 1 and optimally in Γ 2 afterwards, player 1 can get a payoff not lower than:
This should not exceed the payoff obtained against τ by playing J 1 at period 1 and following σ afterwards, and this payoff is not greater than
because if y > 0 the continuation strategies after (J 1 , W 2 ) should form a Nash equilibrium of the corresponding subgame. Because δv δ < ε−2r(1+δ), we obtain that ε − r > δ(v δ + 3r) + (1 − δ)r. Because δv δ < ε − 4r and δ ≥ 1 − 2r, we have δv δ < ε − 2r + δ − 1, and this implies δ(1 − v δ ) − r > 1 − ε + r. Consequently, for all values of y in [0, 1] we have A > B, which is a contradiction. Hence we obtain x = 1, and by symmetry y = 1. All Nash equilibrium of Γ play W 1 and W 2 in period 1, and the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs E δ is included in the square [ε − r, ε + r]
2 . The players can combine (W 1 , W 2 ) in period 1 with the repetition of any given mixed Nash equilibrium of G, so any point in the square can be achieved at equilibrium, and E δ = [ε − r, ε + r]
2 . Considering sequential equilibria, or introducing a correlation device, even with communication, would not modify the above proof. And this is the same with stationary equilibria of the associated stochastic game with state variable the belief on K. This proves 1) of the proposition.
2) We proceed similarly for δ in ∆ 2 . We have v δ > r +(1−2r)(ε+5r) > ε+4r, which implies both: δv δ > ε+4r 1+2r > ε+2r, and δv δ > δ(ε+4r) ≥ ε+2r+δ(1+2r)−1. Let (σ, τ ) be a Nash equilibrium of the δ-discounted game Γ, and with x, resp. y, being the probability that σ plays W 1 , resp. τ plays W 2 , at period 1. Assume for the sake of contradiction that x > 0. By playing W 1 at period 1 and following σ afterwards, the payoff of player 1 against τ is at most:
This should not be lower than the payoff obtained by playing J 1 at period 1 and optimally in Γ 1 afterwards, so not lower than:
Since δv δ > ε + 2r and δv δ > ε + 2r + δ(1 + 2r) − 1, we get B ′ > A ′ , hence a contradiction. We deduce x = 0, and by symmetry y = 0. And point 2) of the proposition follows.
Since ε + r < 1 − ε − r, proposition 4.11 clearly implies that no converging selection of (E δ ) δ exists.
We now consider perturbations of the payoffs. Let, for η ∈ [0, r(ε−5r) 4 ), Γ(η) be a HSG obtained from Γ by perturbing each payoff by at most η, and denote by E δ (η), resp. E ′ δ (η), the corresponding set of δ-discounted Nash, resp. sequential equilibrium payoffs with initial state k 1 .
Moreover , lim
3) There is no converging selection (x δ ) δ of (E δ (η)) δ .
4) The game Γ(η) has no uniform equilibrium payoff.
The proof is in the Appendix, and concludes the proof of Theorem 3.4.
27

Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2.1 Let W be the set of (δ, x, y, r)
such that (x, y) is a stationary equilibrium in Γ δ , and r is the associated payoff equilibrium. Then (δ, x, y, r) ∈ W if and only if for all (k, i, j) ∈ K × I × J, it satisfies the following inequalities and equalities :
Thus W is a semi-algebraic set. For δ ∈ [0, 1), let W δ := (x, y, r) ∈ R I × R J × R 2 K | (δ, x, y, r) ∈ W .
Then W δ is non-empty and compact. Applying the Main Theorem in [13] to T = [0, 1) and A = W , we deduce that (W δ ) converges for the Hausdorff metric when δ goes to 1. In particular, (E We now turn to the proof of conditions 2) and 3) of proposition 4.5, and start with a lemma. 
and for a ≥ 0 such that |a − a * | ≥ 1/2,
Proof of lemma 5.1: We use 1 − αδ ≥ 1 − α in the fist line below and δ −a * −1 ≥ 1 in the third line below to obtain the LHS of (3): . If a ≥ a * +1/2, we have α −a ≥ α −a * −1/2 and we write: We conclude with the RHS of (3). We use δ −a * −1 ≥ 1 in the first inequality below, and to the proof of 1).
3) We have ε + r + η < ε + r(1 + 1 2 ε − 5r) < 1/2 since r < ε/5 and ε < 5/12. Hence there is no converging selection (x δ ) δ of (E δ (η)) δ .
4) It remains to prove that Γ(η) has no equilibrium payoff, i.e. that for ε ′ small enough, there is no strategy profile which is an ε ′ -equilibrium of all discounted games Γ(η) with high enough discount factors.
We proceed by contradiction, and assume that for each ε ′ > 0, on can find a discount δ ε ′ in (0,1), and a strategy profile (σ, τ ) = (σ ε ′ , τ ε ′ ) which is an ε ′ -equilibrium of each game Γ(η) with discount δ > δ ε ′ . Denote by x = x ε ′ , resp. y = y ε ′ , the probability that σ plays W 1 , resp. τ plays W 2 at stage 1. The δ-discounted payoff of player 1 induced by (σ ε , τ ε ) is by definition: a) By definition (σ, τ ) is an ε ′ -equilibrium, so playing J 1 at period 1 then optimally afterwards against τ should not increase player1's payoff by more than ε ′ , i.e; y sup Rearranging terms, the above equation is equivalent to: 2ε ′ + 2x(r + η)(2 − y) ≥ x(δv δ − ε).
x = x ε ′ and y = y ε ′ depend on ε ′ . Consider δ in ∆ 2 , we have v δ > ε + 4(r + η). So there exists ε ′′ > 0, independent from ε ′ , such that for all δ high enough in ∆ 2 : 2ε ′ + 2x ε ′ (r + η)(2 − y ε ′ ) ≥ 4x ε ′ (r + η) + x ε ′ ε ′′ .
Passing to the limit gives:
0.
And by symmetry between the players, we also have lim ε ′ →0 y ε ′ = 0.
b) We finally write that playing W 1 at period 1 then optimally afterwards against τ should not increase player 1's payoff by more than ε ′ , i.e; y sup
This implies:
We have g
Together with inequality (9), the above implies :
2ε
′ + 2(r + η)(1 − x)(1 + y) ≥ (1 − x)(ε − 1 + δ(1 − v δ )).
For δ ∈ ∆ 1 , we have v δ < ε − 4(r + η) so for all δ high enough in ∆ 1 : ε − 1 + δ(1 − v δ ) ≥ 4(r + η) and we obtain:
We finally get a contradiction since lim ε ′ →0 x = lim ε ′ →0 y = 0.
